Elaborate protocols in Secure Multi-party Computation enable several participants to compute a public function of their own private inputs while ensuring that no undesired information leaks about the private inputs, and without resorting to any trusted third party. However, the public output of the computation inevitably leaks some information about the private inputs. Recent works have introduced a framework and proposed some techniques for quantifying such information flow. Yet, owing to their complexity, those methods do not scale to practical situations that may involve large input spaces. The main contribution of the work reported here is to formally investigate the information flow captured by the min-entropy in the particular case of secure three-party computations of affine functions in order to make its quantification scalable to realistic scenarios. To this end, we mathematically derive an explicit formula for this entropy under uniform prior beliefs about the inputs. We show that this closed-form expression can be computed in time constant in the inputs sizes and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function. Finally, we formulate some theoretical bounds for this privacy leak in the presence of non-uniform prior beliefs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) is a domain of cryptography that aims at enabling several parties to compute a public function of their own private inputs, while keeping the inputs secret and without resorting to any trusted third party [1] - [3] . SMC protocols provide the guarantee that none of the parties will be able to infer any information about the other parties' input, other than the information conveyed by the public output itself. Paradoxically, as a function of the inputs, the public output inevitably leaks some information about those private inputs. This leakage is considered as an inherent consequence of the primary objective of SMC: it is commonly qualified as the "acceptable leakage" and its study is thus largely ignored in the SMC literature [4] - [6] .
Recent works have been undertaken with the aim of quantifying such information flows [7] - [9] . By adapting techniques from Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) and applying concepts from Information Theory (IT) to the context of SMC, they introduce an attack model and a general notion of entropy that enable us not only to reason about the acceptable leakage in SMC, but also to construct bespoke privacy-enhancing mechanisms aimed at protecting the inputs' secrecy. In this attack model, the entropy of a targeted input reflects the amount of information that is gained by an attacker about its targeted input once the output is revealed.
These techniques offer a rich framework for analysing information flows in SMC. But their computation is essentially combinatorial, and their application in practice is thus impeded by the scalability of computing this combinatorics. Indeed, in the general case, the time complexity of computing such entropy measures is quadratic in the product of the inputs sizes, making them inadequate for examining real world applications of SMC that may involve large input spaces.
In this paper, we focus on secure three-party computations, to which cryptographers have recently drawn particular attention [10] , [11] , and we study the class of functions that are affine in the target's and the spectator's inputs, while the amount of information that an attacker gains on a targeted input will be measured by means of conditional minentropy. In this setting, our main contribution is to reduce the combinatorial essence of this information measure to a closed-form expression that has time complexity constant in the inputs sizes, and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function. As this reduction is valid under uniform prior beliefs on the inputs, we also get explicit bounds for this information measure in the presence of non-uniform prior beliefs.
Outline of Paper. Section II formalises the analysis of secure three-party affine computations. In Section III, we study the attacker's information gain under uniform prior beliefs. Explicit bounds for the information flow under non-uniform prior beliefs are given in Section IV. Section V concludes.
Notations. For sets D, their cardinality is denoted by |D|. Let Ω(D) be the set of all probability distributions whose support is contained in D. Throughout, we present distributions as Python dictionaries, e.g., {4 : 1 2 , 8 : 1 2 } represents the uniform distribution over {4, 8}. For any integers a and b, we will write a; b for the set of consecutive integers ranging from a to b, namely {a, a + 1, · · · , b}. We write gcd(a, b) for the greatest common divisor of a and b. Let i = j mod k denote that i−j is a multiple of k and set [i] k = {j ∈ Z | j = i mod k}. For any real r, the floor of r will be denoted by r while r will denote its ceiling. For random variable X and value x, we write x for the event "X = x" and p(x) for its probability, whenever this is clear from context. We write x for x∈D whenever the domain D is clear from context. The logarithm in base 2 will be denoted as log.
Related Works. Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) [12] , [13] provides frameworks and techniques based on information theory and probability theory for measuring the amount of information that leaks from a secret. Different mathematical concepts have emerged in order to convey varied and precise information about a secret [14] - [17] . In this work, we will measure the information gained by an attacker by means of min-entropy, which is used extensively in cryptography in order to quantify the vulnerability of a secret.
Differential Privacy (DP) [18] , [19] formalises privacy concerns and introduces techniques that provide users of a database with the assurance that their personal details will not have a significant impact on the output of the queries performed on the database.
Unlike DP and other works that have been conducted on trading off privacy and utility in SMC, this work does not intend to enhance the inputs privacy. Instead, our objective is to propose an efficient method for quantifying the privacy risks that a certain kind of computations presents.
II. INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS IN SECURE
THREE-PARTY AFFINE COMPUTATIONS Recent works [7] - [9] have adapted techniques stemming from QIF to the SMC setting in order to propose a model that allows us to reason about the acceptable leakage. We will adapt this model to secure three-party affine computations.
Let us consider three parties X , Y and Z holding the respective private inputs x, y and z. Let f be a public function of three variables. We assume that the parties wish to enter the secure computation of o = f (x, y, z) and that X is attacking Y under spectator Z, i.e. that we wish to quantify the information that X learns about y given the knowledge of his own input x and the public output o.
We further assume that function f is affine in the target's and spectator's inputs, i.e. that we can choose three constant integers α, β and γ so as to express the output of f as f (x, y, z) = α + βy + γz.
Note that constants α, β and γ may be function of input x, which will also be considered as a constant. Admissible candidates for such affine functions f can for example be defined
Assumption 1. To the attacker, input x is a known value and will thus be considered as a constant throughout this paper.
Thus, we may abuse notation by omitting the first argument of f , and refer to its output o as:
From the point of view of attacker X , although x is a known and constant value, the inputs y and z appear as unknown values and will be modelled as random variables Y and Z. Parties Y and Z are supposed to be honest parties who will not collaborate. Thus, random variables Y and Z are deemed to be independent. We further assume that the target's and spectator's inputs are from finite intervals I Y and I Z :
Their prior probability distributions π Y and π Z will represent the prior beliefs that X may have on those values, such that π Y ∈ Ω(I Y ) and π Z ∈ Ω(I Z ). We note that the absence of prior belief may be represented as uniform prior distributions.
We define the random variable O representing the output as
The output domain is:
By denoting the min-entropy by H, the amount of information that the attacker gains on the targeted input once the output is revealed will be quantified by H(Y | x, O), which captures the probability of secret Y to be guessed in one try. Since the value of x will also be considered as a public constant in the present privacy analyses, we will refer to this quantity as
In order to simplify the following development, we will examine the particular case when β or γ is zero.
Assumption 2. Throughout the paper, β and γ are non-zero.
III. PRIVACY UNDER UNIFORM PRIOR BELIEFS A. Reducing the entropy expression
In this section, we study the case where the attacker has no prior belief on the target's and spectator's inputs, i.e. when π Y and π Z are uniform on I Y and I Z respectively. In other words, we assume that for all y in I Y and z in I Z , we have p(y) = 1 |IY | and p(z) = 1 |IZ | . As π Y is uniform, we have:
By definition, we know that for all output o in D O , there exists at least one pair (y, z) in I Y ×I Z that satisfies f (y, z) = o. For all such pairs, as Y and Z are independent, so we have:
since for a given o and y, there is at most one z that satisfies f (y, z ) = o as f is affine and γ is non-zero. Consequently, p(o | y) = 1 |IZ | since π Z is uniform, and thus:
where N O denotes the cardinal of D O . We mention four simplifications before studying how to compute N O . We argue in the full version that we can make those assumptions without loss of generality. + γ) ), function f can be factorised we can assume β and γ to be coprime.
B. Measuring the size of the output domain
Let n, m be two non-negative integers and β and γ be two positive integers. Let us also assume that β and γ are coprime. We want to calculate the cardinal N O of the set A defined as
We note that |A| is positive and upper bounded by (n + 1)(m + 1). Since different pairs (y, z) and (y , z ) in 0; n × 0; m may satisfy βy + γz = βy + γz , cardinality |A| will often be lower than (n + 1)(m + 1). We also notice that A ⊆ 0; βn + γm , and thus we also have |A| ≤ βn + γm + 1.
Recall 1. For all real numbers x, we have −x = − x .
Recall 2. Let p and q in N be coprime. We have: Proof. Since β and γ are coprime, we have:
Lemma 3. Let (y, z) = (y , z ) be in 0; n × 0; m . We have:
Proof. Let (y, z) and (y , z ) be two distinct pairs in 0; n × 0; m such that βy +γz = βy +γz . By Lemma 2, there is k in Z such that: y − y = kγ ∧ z − z = kβ. As (y, z) = (y , z ), we further know that k is different from 0. This implies that: |y − y| ≥ γ ∧ |z − z| ≥ β. But as y and y belong to 0; n and z and z belong to 0; m , we also know that: |y − y| ≤ n ∧ |z − z| ≤ m and thus: n ≥ γ ∧ m ≥ β. Corollary 1. If n < γ ∨ m < β, then |A| = (n + 1)(m + 1).
Proof. Let us assume that n < γ or m < β. Define the function g as g : (y, z) −→ βy + γz with domain 0; n × 0; m −→ 0; βn + γm . By virtue of Lemma 3, we know that the function g is injective. Thus, we have: |A| = |g( 0; n × 0; m )| = (n + 1)(m + 1).
Assumption 4.
In the remainder of this section, we will now assume that n ≥ γ ∧ m > β. Proof. Let o be in A. Let (y, z) and (y , z ) be two distinct pairs in 0; n × 0; m such that: βy +γz = o∧βy +γz = o. By virtue of Lemma 2, we can take k in Z such that:
Since both pairs are distinct, we can thus choose k different from 0. Without loss of generality, let us assume that (y, z) > 2 (y , z ) where > 2 refers to the lexicographic order on integer pairs. In other words, let us assume that k > 0. We know that z ≥ 0 and Equation (6) ensures that y ≥ γ since k > 0. As o = βy + γz , we thus have o ≥ βγ.
Conversely, we know that y ≤ n and Equation (6) 
Proof. Let o be in 0; βn + γm . We know that β and γ are coprime, so we can take two integers y and z in Z such that o = βy + γz and we have:
Corollary 2. We have:
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5.
For all j in 0; γ − 1 , we define:
Then we can write A as A = n i=0 A i = j∈ 0;γ−1 B j . Lemma 6. For all j in 0; γ − 1 , we have:
Proof. Let j be in 0; γ − 1 . For all q in 0; n−j γ , let us define the predicate P q as follows:
A j+γk = [βj] γ ∩ βj; β(j + γq) + γm and let us prove by induction that P q holds for all q in 0; n−j γ . By definition, we have:
A j+γk = A j = [βj] γ ∩ βj; βj + γm and thus P 0 holds. Let q be in 0; n−j γ − 1 and let us assume that P q holds. By definition, we have: A j+γk =[βj] γ ∩ βj; β(j + γq) + γm ∪ β(j + γ(q + 1)); β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γm (10) However, as m ≥ β, we know that β(j + γq) + γm ≥ β(j + γ(q + 1)). And so Equation (10) becomes: q+1 k=0 A j+γk = [βj] γ ∩ βj; β(j + γ(q + 1)) + γm Thus P q+1 holds, concluding the induction.
Lemma 7. For all j in 0; γ − 1 , we have:
Proof. Let j be in 0; γ − 1 . Lemma 6 ensures that B j = [βj] γ ∩ βj; β(j + γ n−j γ ) + γm . Since βj ≤ βγ, we have
By definition of the floor function, Equation (13) 
Proof. Let us define the intervals I 1 , I 2 and I 3 as follows:
We notice that (I 1 , I 2 , I 3 ) forms a partition of 0; βn + γm and thus we can partition A into (A∩I 1 , A∩I 2 , A∩I 3 ), which enables us to express the cardinal of A as the following sum:
By Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, |A ∩ I 1 | = |A ∩ I 3 | = βγ − (β−1)(γ−1) 2
. By Theorem 2, A ∩ I 2 = I 2 and thus |A ∩ I 2 | = |I 2 | = βn + γm − 2βγ + 1. Then, Eq. (14) becomes:
In the next corollary, we can synthesise the previous results and realise one of our main objectives: a closed-form expression for H(Y | O) under uniform prior beliefs.
Corollary 3. Let f be defined as f (y, z) = α + βy + γz with α, β and γ being three constant integer values, with non-zero β and γ. We assume that Y and Z are ranged in the respective intervals I Y and I Z of size (n + 1) and (m + 1) respectively, and we assume that Y and Z are uniformly distributed on those intervals. Let d be the greatest common divisor of β and γ, and let us define β = | β d | and γ = | γ d | where here |x| represents the absolute value of integer x. Then, we have:
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 3 and Eq. (1).
This gives us a method for quantifying the information leaks about a targeted party from the public output of an SMC under uniform prior beliefs. This method requires a computational time that is constant in the inputs size and logarithmic in the coefficients of the affine function due to the greatest common divisor operation. We next show how to reason about H(Y | O) when an attacker has some prior beliefs about Y and Z.
IV. BOUNDS UNDER NON-UNIFORM PRIOR BELIEFS
In this section, we present lower and upper bounds for H(Y | O) under non-uniform prior beliefs on the target's and the spectator's input. The next theorem imposes a lower bound. We will now study some upper bounds for H(Y | O). It is a known result on the min-entropy that H(Y | O) ≤ H(Y ), i.e. that knowledge of the public output cannot increase the targeted input's entropy. We will now claim that H(Y | O) ≤ H(Z), i.e. the remaining entropy of Y given knowledge of O cannot be larger than the prior entropy of the spectator's input Z. To this end, we first state in the next theorem that an attacker eavesdropping on the value of x and learning the public output will gain the same amount of information on targeted input Y than on the spectator's input Z. 
V. CONCLUSION
Although extensive researches in Secure Multi-party Computation have considerably improved the efficiency of cryptographic protocols, the quantification of the acceptable leakage is a problem that still requires deeper investigations. Indeed, the computational complexity of those recently introduced privacy analyses does not yet allow their application in practical situations that involve large input spaces. In this work, we focused our attention on secure three-party computations of affine functions. We have derived an explicit formula for the min-entropy of the targeted input given conditional knowledge of the output. Its calculation requires a computational time that is constant in the inputs sizes and logarithmic in the coefficients of the function. Finally, we have derived some theoretical bounds for this acceptable leakage when the input prior distributions are non-uniform.
Our present work naturally adapts to the presence of several attackers since their inputs would be considered as constant by virtue of Assumption 1. In the future, we would like to study more general computations that may involve a higher number of parties, continuous inputs and non linear terms.
